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Over the past sixty years, the size of the Supreme Court’s docket has varied tremendously, growing at 
some points in time and shrinking at others. What accounts for this variation in the size of the docket? We 
focus on two key strategic factors – the predictability of outcomes within the Court, and whether justices 
consider the potential actions of other political institutions – and assess whether these factors help to 
explain the variation in docket size over time. We discover that uncertainty and institutional constraints 
prevent the Court from choosing cases with complete freedom, even after accounting for other potential 
influences on the size of the Court’s docket.  
 




The size of the Supreme Court’s docket has exhibited marked variability over time. At some 
points, such as between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s, the docket increased in size. At other times, it 
decreased, with a low of 69 cases in 2007 prompting consternation among Court watchers.1 Even when 
the size of the docket has not exhibited either a steady increase or a steady decrease over a period of 
years, it has shown some notable year-to-year volatility. 
 Surprisingly, however, other than some recent attention from journalists and legal scholars – and 
one recent analysis by political scientists that we discuss below and throughout this paper – the aggregate 
size of the Court’s docket has received little attention from social scientists and rarely has been subjected 
to rigorous empirical examination. We address this gap by focusing on a strategic explanation for the 
variation in the size of the Court’s docket. This explanation suggests that justices themselves are strategic 
actors and that variation in docket size reflects the calculations that they make. 
Their calculations are based upon two key considerations. First, docket size may reflect 
uncertainty within the Court about the eventual outcomes when it hears cases. That is, justices may accept 
fewer cases because they do not want to risk granting certiorari (hereafter cert) when the outcome within 
the Court itself is uncertain, and they may accept a higher number when they are more confident that they 
can predict outcomes. Second, the size could depend on the Court’s view of other political institutions, 
with the Court less likely to hear cases when its views are at odds with those of the other branches. After 
controlling for a variety of non-strategic factors that may potentially influence docket size, we find that 
the Court strategically considers these factors when constructing its docket. 
Our approach builds on Owens and Simon’s (2012) recent and insightful examination of the size 
of the docket. To our knowledge, theirs is the only other study that has systematically explored potential 
                                                 
1
 In a 2007 Time article entitled "The Incredibly Shrinking Court," Von Drehle (2007) noted that while the citizens 
of the United States are the world’s most prolific litigators, “our lawsuits aren't sexy enough to interest the Justices 
of the Roberts Court. We're not that into them, and they're not that into us.” The issue’s cover went so far as to pose 
the question, “Does the Supreme Court Still Matter?” See also Starr (2005-2006) and Chandler and Harris (2010). 
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explanatory factors in a multivariate framework. Our analysis follows the trail that they have broken, but 
with several noteworthy differences. First, we consider the potential effects of other institutions, which 
allows us to focus on not only the internal factors that both we and they identify – namely, uncertainty 
about eventual outcomes – but also external factors. Thus, our analysis contributes to the literatures on 
both strategic behavior within the Court and strategic behavior with respect to other political institutions. 
Second, we explore a wider range of measures that capture uncertainty. Like Owens and Simon (2012), 
we find evidence of internal strategic behavior, with the Court less likely to hear more cases when justices 
are less certain about the outcome; but we also find that such evidence is inconsistent across a range of 
measures that credibly capture uncertainty. Third, we include a wider range of contextual factors that 
other scholars have identified as important influences on docket size, but that Owens and Simon did not 
incorporate into their analysis. And finally, we utilize a methodological approach that allows us to more 
appropriately account for the time-series nature of the data.  
The Supreme Court’s Docket Since 1946 
Figure One displays the size of the Court’s docket by term from 1946 through 2009. This figure 
demonstrates that variation in the number of cases the Court hears each term is not new.2 Nor is the 
current smaller docket size unprecedented – in 1953, for example, the Court heard 85 cases, only a 
handful more than the Court has heard in recent years. Before 1953, the number of cases was as high as 
140 in 1946 and as low as 91 in 1951. Beginning in 1953, the number of cases increased and then leveled 
out, increasing again in the early 1970s. Then, throughout the 1970s and into the late 1980s, the Court 
heard about 150 cases per term, a figure that gradually dropped until the Court was consistently accepting 
fewer than 80 cases for review each year from 1998 onward. Overall, then, docket size exhibits four 
general trends: a decrease between 1946 and 1953; an increase between 1953 and 1971; a decrease 
starting in 1987; and annual volatility.  
[FIGURE ONE ABOUT HERE] 
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 Later we discuss in more detail how we measure docket size. 
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Why Study the Docket? 
Why should we care about the size of the Court’s docket? To begin with, variation in the size of 
the Court’s docket stems from fluctuation in the size of the Court’s discretionary docket. In this way, 
variation reflects the decisions that the justices make, so examining the factors that influence docket size 
provides an opportunity to understand decision-making on the Court.  
Of course, it may be that the variation in caseload is a function of demand. Figure Two, however, 
makes it clear that this is not so. Although docket size has fluctuated, the number of cases submitted to 
the Court for review has steadily increased. In 1946, there were about 1,300 petitions for review. The 
number of petitions then rose incrementally for two decades, leveled off somewhat throughout most of the 
1970s and 1980s, and then increased dramatically starting in the late 1980s, exceeding 10,000 in 2006. 
Despite this significant and generally monotonic trend, however, the Court’s docket has not responded 
accordingly. Fluctuations in docket size appear to be largely unrelated to the number of petitions 
submitted to the Court; indeed, the correlation between these two variables is negative (r = -.32). 
[FIGURE TWO ABOUT HERE] 
Beyond helping us understand judicial decision-making and allowing us to assess whether 
justices behave strategically, there are several other reasons why it is crucial to understand why docket 
size has varied over time.3 Some of these reasons are positive, while others are normative; some have 
been highlighted by judicial and legal scholars, while others have been raised by the justices themselves. 
Our point in raising these reasons is not to test them, but to justify why it is vital to understand temporal 
changes in docket size. 
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 In this section, we draw upon the excellent discussion in Owens and Simon (2012). See their more detailed 
discussion regarding the importance of this topic, which also identifies and explores a number of other justifications 
that we do not include (e.g., larger dockets allow a broader range of interests to be represented, while smaller 
dockets may allow certain interests to have excessive influence). 
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To begin with, the number of cases the Court hears each term can be taken as an indicator of the 
justices’ workloads. During the Burger Court, the justices’ increasing workload became such a concern 
that some participants and observers recommended the creation of a national court of appeals (O’Brien 
2005). In 1987, Baker and McFarland (1987) estimated that each justice read over 400,000 pages of 
written documents and spent over 800 hours writing opinions, attending conferences, and hearing oral 
arguments each term. Such an unmanageable workload has a host of negative repercussions for the 
Court’s work, including “fragmented majorities, separate opinions, and sometimes even inadequate 
analysis” (Baker and McFarland 1987, 1401). Some justices agreed that the Court was overworked. In his 
1984 year-end report, Chief Justice Burger explained that the “Justices must now work beyond any sound 
maximum limits” (Baker and McFarland 1987, 1400).4  
 In addition, docket size may also be viewed as a sign of the scope of the Court’s influence. 
Rightly or wrongly, many assume that the Court “matters” more when it has a larger docket, and less 
when it hears fewer cases. In fact, some claim that the Court abdicates its duty when the size of the docket 
is too small (Hellman 1996). In part, this is because the Court isolates itself by not using its supervisory 
authority. And, in part, it is because as the Court takes fewer cases, important legal issues may be 
overlooked, leaving gaps in doctrine and a shortage of precedent. 
 Finally, the size of the docket has implications for the proper role of the Court. On one hand, 
some view it as the Court’s obligation to hear and address cases to provide consistency across circuits 
(Baker and McFarland 1987). By hearing more cases, the Court can provide national unity, reduce 
jurisdiction, reduce the likelihood of judicial error by the lower courts, and so on (Hellman 1996). On the 
other hand, several justices have argued that a low caseload reflects the Court’s proper role in the 
American judicial system. The Court, according to this view, was never meant to be a common-law court 
that rectifies every error in the lower courts. Justice Scalia (1987), for example, explained that the Court 
should not “gradually clos[e] in on a fully articulated rule of law by deciding one discrete fact situation 
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 But see also Brennan (1973) and Black (1974). 
 5
after another.” Rather, the justices need to “tolerat[e] a fair degree of diversity” in the manner rules are 
applied across the nation (Hellman 1996, 430). Justices Rehnquist and Ginsburg similarly expressed that 
they do not need to take each interesting case that comes before them, even if they believe it was decided 
incorrectly; and Justices Kennedy and Souter told the House Appropriations Committee that enough 
precedent was being established to guide the nation’s judiciary through conflict (Hellman 1996).5 
Clearly, then, there are significant reasons why understanding variation in the size of the Court’s 
docket is important, reflecting both the potential effects of docket size and normative views about the role 
of the Court. In addition, investigating the factors that affect docket size allows us to make inferences 
about the extent to which strategic concerns influence the Court’s actions. In the following sections, we 
provide a theoretical argument about how strategic factors affect docket size, outline our hypotheses 
regarding these strategic considerations, and discuss other factors that have been identified as potentially 
influencing docket size. 
Strategic Considerations and the Variation in Docket Size 
Like all political actors, justices can make strategic calculations when deciding whether to act. 
These calculations inevitably consider constraints that stem from the potential actions of both their 
brethren on the bench and by actors outside of the Court. Broadly speaking, then, strategic behavior on 
the Court can take two forms: internal and external. The importance of both internal and external 
constraints in shaping judicial decisions has been recognized for decades (e.g., Murphy 1964), and has 
been the focus of recent work on judicial decision-making in both the US (Bailey, Maltzman, and Shipan 
2011) and abroad (Ferejohn, Rosenbluth, and Shipan 2007). 
To behave strategically, though, political actors need a context that facilitates such behavior. We 
contend that the process by which cases reach the Court provides this context. In the next section, we 
describe this context and identify how it facilitates strategic behavior. Following that, we address the two 
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 Chief Justice Rehnquist also stated that the Court simply cannot review all decisions where conflict exists (Baker 
and McFarland 1987). 
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types of strategic behavior that justices might engage in with respect to filling the docket, focusing first on 
internal considerations and second on external considerations.  
Context for Strategic Behavior: Supreme Court Case Selection 
When a party in a lower court case loses, it has the option to appeal the decision that was made to 
the Supreme Court. The primary route by which to do this is to file a petition for a writ of certiorari with 
the Court. Before Chief Justice Burger created the cert pool in the early 1970s, each justice (with his 
clerks) examined every case and began the case selection process by eliminating those cases that 
obviously lacked merit or lacked a set of “good facts” (see Perry 1991).6 When the cert pool was created, 
justices who participated effectively delegated part of this process to a pool of law clerks, one of whom 
would be randomly selected to write a brief memoranda about each case (Palmer 2001). Justices who 
participated could then draw upon these memoranda to decide which cases merited further review. 
From here, the Chief Justice creates the “discuss list,” which comprises those cases that are 
considered worthy enough to be discussed at conference for discussion and voting (Stern, Gressman, 
Shapiro, and Geller 2002). Associate justices can add petitions to this list that they think the Court should 
consider. Based on the outputs of these earlier stages, including the cert pool, the Chief Justice’s discuss 
list, and the addition by associate justices of petitions to be discussed, the justices then vote on which 
cases to hear.  
 From the standpoint of understanding changes in docket size over time, this process of deciding 
which cases to hear has four key features. First, justices have discretion about which cases to hear, with 
the freedom to vote in favor of cases they want to hear and against those they want to avoid. Second, they 
do not need to provide any reasons for opposing cert. Third, they conduct this process largely away from 
public view, which is especially important from the standpoint of considering external influences. Finally, 
the process provides them with additional information about the views and opinions of their colleagues. 
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 According to Brennan (1973), over 90% of in forma pauperis petitions lacked merit. 
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Taken together, the features of this process thus provide justices with an ideal opportunity to 
behave strategically when deciding which cases to hear. Before and after the creation of the cert pool, the 
process provides justices with ample opportunity to exercise judgment, to make carefully calculated and 
informed choices about the size and content of the Court’s docket, and to do so in a private process.7 In 
the following sections, we argue that the size of the Court’s docket results from the combination of the 
strategic opportunities that arise from this process with the internal and external considerations that affect 
justices’ strategies and choices.  
Internal Considerations: Uncertainty within the Court 
Internal strategic behavior occurs when justices adapt their behavior in anticipation of the 
preferences and behavior of their colleagues. The idea that justices engage in this sort of strategic 
behavior is well established in the judicial politics literature, beginning with Murphy’s (1964) pioneering 
analysis and continuing through a wide range of case-oriented and statistical tests (e.g., Maltzman, 
Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000; Epstein and Knight 1998). In particular, several studies have established 
that individual justices take uncertainty into account when deciding whether to grant cert. Caldeira, 
Wright, and Zorn (1999) demonstrate that justices vote strategically when deciding whether to hear cases, 
taking into account the ideological preferences of other justices, as well as uncertainty about the outcomes 
that are likely to result if the Court hears the case. Importantly, from our perspective, their evidence 
shows that these strategic calculations can affect the number of cases on the docket. Although their study 
is one of the richest theoretical explorations of internal behavior, several other studies have also provided 
strong theoretical and empirical evidence that individual justices behave strategically, taking into account 
ideology, uncertainty about potential outcomes, the views of the Solicitor General, and other factors (e.g., 
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 We recognize that some (e.g., Starr 2005-2006) have argued that the creation of the cert pool has had the effect of 
reducing the number of cases the Court hears, partly due to the pressures it places upon clerks to recommend 
denying cert. In our view, the opportunity for justices to choose cases strategically does not depend on the existence 
of the cert pool. Still, we address the possibility that the creation of the cert pool might have produced a smaller 
docket size when discussing additional checks on our main results. 
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legal considerations) when deciding whether to grant cert (e.g., Palmer 1982; Black and Owens 2009, 
2012; Brenner and Krol 1989).  
These studies identify the considerations that affect individual justices’ cert votes. But the logic 
behind these studies, especially as related to strategic behavior and uncertainty about potential outcomes, 
also can provide insights into the aggregate size of the docket and how it varies over time (Owens and 
Simon 2012). Consider the decision of an individual justice who is trying to decide whether to vote in 
favor of granting cert to a case. This justice might be certain that colleagues share her views about the 
merits of the case; uncertain about their views; or certain that they will disagree with her. We consider 
each scenario below. 
To begin with, if this justice is certain that at least four of her colleagues will agree with her 
views, and thus that her views will prevail, she is more likely to vote to hear the case.8 Thus, if the case 
concerns a lower court ruling and the justice agrees with that ruling, then greater certainty that her 
colleagues share her views increases the likelihood that she votes to hear the case. Doing so will likely 
result in affirming the lower court’s decision and applying the outcome to the entire country. 
The justice’s certainty regarding her colleagues’ views also can work in the opposite direction – 
that is, she may be certain that their views differ from hers. In the example being used, then, she may be 
relatively certain that they will vote to reverse the lower court. In this scenario, the justice votes against 
granting cert, preferring that the Court not hear the case and instead wanting the lower court’s decision to 
stand. This justice’s views will not prevail because at least four justices – the ones whose views differ 
from hers – will vote in favor of granting cert. Thus, in this scenario, like the first scenario, the Court 
hears the case because her colleagues will likely vote to grant cert. 
What if this justice is uncertain about how the other justices will vote? In this scenario, voting to 
hear the case becomes risky, because as she becomes more uncertain about how her colleagues might 
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 Stras (2010, 154), for example, notes that justices may consider “whether plenary review of the case is likely to 
result in an outcome or holding that is consistent with their ideological views.” 
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vote, she becomes increasingly leery of hearing the case. The logic is straightforward: even though she 
personally would like to affirm the lower court’s ruling, her uncertainty about her colleagues’ preferences 
– and the possibility that her colleagues might vote to reverse the lower court – means she will vote 
against cert, preferring to leave the lower court’s decision in place for at least part of the country rather 
than having it reversed for the entire nation. 
Importantly, the logic spelled out for this individual justice in the preceding discussion has 
aggregate-level implications. First, when uncertainty is low, there will always be enough votes to grant 
cert and to hear the case. With respect to our hypothetical justice, if she favors hearing the case because 
she is relatively certain that her colleagues share her views, then she (along with the others who share her 
views) will vote to hear the case. And since only four votes are needed to hear the case, it is likely that at 
least that many justices will vote to grant cert. But even if the justice is relatively certain that her 
colleagues do not share her views, the vote in favor of granting cert is still likely to be positive. Although 
our hypothetical justice will vote against granting cert (as will the other justices who share her views), a 
majority of justices will prefer the opposite outcome and votes to hear the case. Thus, when certainty is 
high, the Court will hear a higher number of cases. 
Second, if justices are uncertain about how their colleagues will vote, they will be more hesitant 
to vote in favor of granting cert, with those who favor reversing the lower court fearing that others might 
vote to affirm, while those who want to affirm will worry that the others might vote to reverse. As a 
result, under high levels of uncertainty justices will be reticent to hear cases and the Court will hear fewer 
cases overall. 
Consequently, the amount of uncertainty that justices have about the final outcome should affect 
the aggregate docket size. When uncertainty is low, the Court will hear more cases. On the other hand, 
when uncertainty is high, the Court will hear fewer cases. Notably, the process by which justices decide 
which cases to hear facilitates the possibility of such behavior. With respect to these internal 
considerations, it does so by providing justices with discretion about which cases to hear, as well as the 
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opportunity to learn more about their colleagues’ views.9 Thus, the effects of uncertainty can be tested at 
the aggregate level, leading to the following hypothesis: 
H1 (Uncertainty Hypothesis): The Court will hear a higher (lower) number of cases as outcomes 
on the bench become more (less) certain. 
External Considerations: Separation of Powers  
In addition to internal considerations, numerous scholars contend that the Court is engaged in a 
separation-of-powers struggle with the executive and legislative branches (e.g., Murphy 1964; Ferejohn 
and Shipan 1990; Harvey and Friedman 2006; Maltzman, Mark, Shipan, and Zilis 2014; Whittington 
2007). To the extent that this occurs, the Court considers the preferences of the other branches of 
government, since failure to do so might produce two types of negative consequences. First, if the Court 
reaches an outcome that runs counter to the preferences of the elected branches, those other branches 
might respond by proposing and passing new laws that decrease the policy utility of justices (Blackstone 
2013). Second, the Court will be wary of other sanctions that Congress and the president may impose on 
the Court, such as decreased jurisdiction, lowered funding, reversing the policy effects of the Court’s 
decisions, and so on (Shipan 1997; 2000). 
Some scholars have argued that such sanctions have a limited effect on the actions of the Court 
(e.g., Segal 1997; Segal and Spaeth 2002). Other scholars, however, have found evidence that the Court 
considers potential congressional reactions when making decisions, even though such threats are not 
carried out frequently (e.g., Epstein and Knight 1998; Harvey and Friedman 2006; Blackstone 2013). Our 
argument recognizes that the existence of the threat can have an effect. Further, we contend only that the 
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 We cannot, of course, test whether justices obtain specific information relevant to their uncertainty during these 
closed conferences, or what type of information they receive. Thus, as we discuss in a later section, our tests rely on 
indicators of past behavior. What we can and do assume, however, is that the conferences provide justices with 
additional corroboration of this past behavior. 
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Court is worried about any potential negative repercussions, regardless of the form that they may take, 
and that it will proceed more cautiously when it thinks such actions are more likely.10 
This last point is worth elaborating. Given the huge volume of cases the Court is asked to hear 
each year, it would be impossible for justices to determine how Congress and the president might react on 
every single case. Even with the creation of the cert pool, which was designed to help justices deal with 
an increased workload, the Court lacks the capacity to consider the potential reaction of these other actors 
to each potential case. Instead, we argue is that justices are aware of how distant Congress and the 
president are from the Court in terms of ideology and policy preferences. When they are farther away, 
justices will proceed more cautiously and tread more carefully. When these other branches are closer and 
their preferences are more similar, the Court can act more freely, given the lower likelihood of negative 
consequences. Effectively, then, justices and their clerks – whether taking part in the cert pool or acting 
independently – will be on heightened alert when the Court’s actions are more likely to trigger a negative 
reaction. 
 How might the potential for negative consequences when Congress and the president are more 
distant affect the Court? First, it might be insufficiently worried about the possibility that Congress might 
retaliate, or believe strongly enough in its views, that it will simply go ahead and decide to hear the case, 
throwing caution to the wind. Second, it might decide to hear this case, knowing that it can modify the 
final opinion so that the outcome satisfies at least one branch of Congress, thereby decreasing the threat of 
legislative retribution. Third, it might change the types of cases that it chooses to hear, thereby simply 
avoiding cases that will trigger negative reactions. Finally – and central to our argument – it might choose 
to avoid hearing cases that are likely to trigger negative reactions from other political actors. 
 Each of these scenarios is possible. But as long as the Court at least sometimes declines to hear a 
case because justices worry about potential repercussions, and as long as it does not always either modify 
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 Thus, the measure that we use below, which captures whether the Court’s preferred policy lies within the Pareto 
set for elected national officials, can be seen as a proxy for whether the Court’s action is likely to trigger a reaction.  
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its decision or supplant this case with a less controversial one, then the Court will hear fewer cases as its 
preferences diverge from those of other political actors.11 Further, there are good reasons to expect this 
sort of behavior to occur. To begin with, evidence from case studies (e.g., Epstein and Knight 1998) and 
statistical analyses (e.g., Harvey and Friedman 2006; Blackstone 2013) indicates that the Court considers 
the potential for negative reactions and repercussions from Congress when reaching decisions on cases 
and when choosing to hear cases (e.g., Harvey and Friedman 2009). In addition, modifying decisions can 
be a risky proposition, as it might be difficult to determine exactly which outcome will stop just short of 
generating antagonism. Moreover, if the Court needs to modify the outcome, its gain in utility decreases 
such that it might no longer justify the overall costs associated with hearing a case. Finally, if the Court’s 
views differ from those of Congress and the president on one issue, they are also likely to diverge on 
others.  
Once again, the process by which the Court decides which cases to hear provides a good 
opportunity to strategically behave. The process provides justices with the discretion to decide which 
cases they want to hear, the freedom to avoid having to give a reason for their decision, and the ability to 
decide in private (which is especially important when dealing with potentially delicate inter-branch 
considerations). Again, justices need not consider the reactions of the other branches to every case. 
Rather, justices will be on the lookout for those cases that might cause problems and produce negative 
consequences. Thus, divergence between the Court’s preferences and those of the elected branches should 
reduce the number of cases that the Court can hear without worrying about triggering a negative response. 
In turn, this should yield a decrease in the number of cases that the Court hears. If justices’ preferred 
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 For example, Hendershot et al. (2013) explore whether the Court changes the types of cases that it hears over time 
in response to elected branch preferences. They find that the Court indeed does vary its attention to different issue 
types, depending on the preferences held by different branches. However, although changing the types of cases is 
one strategy that the Court can, and does employ, it is not the only strategy that the Court can use. Our argument 
holds if the Court utilizes the fourth approach we listed – avoiding hearing cases that might trigger a negative 
reaction – at least some of the time. 
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outcomes run counter to the preferences of the elected branches, then they will choose to hear fewer 
cases. Our second hypothesis captures this view. 
H2 (Separation of Powers Hypothesis): The Court is likely to hear more (fewer) cases when its 
policy preferences are similar to (differ from) those of the executive and legislative branches. 
Additional Influences on Docket Size 
 To test our main hypotheses, we also need to consider other factors that might influence the size 
of the docket. Although many factors have been posited to affect docket size, we focus on several key 
indicators that other scholars, observers, and participants have identified.12 To begin with, some observers 
assert that the Court sees more opportunities to make policy when Congress and the president have been 
more active in passing laws. Greenhouse contends that “as Congress's willingness to pass new laws has 
waned, the flow of statutory cases has begun to dry up” (2006, A1). Justices themselves have 
promulgated this view, with Chief Justice Roberts citing the lack of major new laws as a significant cause 
of the drop in docket size (Coyle 2007). According to this view, the Court will hear more cases when 
Congress has enacted a higher number of laws, and fewer when Congress has been less active. 
Policy preferences also might shape a justice’s willingness to support granting cert. For many 
years, judicial scholars have suggested that justices act in a manner consistent with their policy 
preferences (Segal and Spaeth 2002). Similarly, some researchers also suggest that judges choose cases to 
overturn lower court decisions that are incompatible with their own ideologies (Baum 1977; Songer 
1979). If true, the Court will take on more cases as ideological harmony between the Court and the lower 
courts decreases, and fewer when it increases (Owens and Simon 2012). 
Institutional factors also might affect the size of the agenda. For instance, the Court gained the 
ability to shape its own docket in 1925, an ability that the 1988 Act to Improve the Administration of 
Justice modified. This Act, which almost completely eliminated the Court’s nondiscretionary jurisdiction, 
led many members of the media and scholars to speculate that it might be a potential cause of the 
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 For a comprehensive list of potential causes, see Chandler and Harris (2010, 2). 
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reductions in docket size observed during the 1990s (Barnes 2007; Greenhouse 2006; O’Brien 1997b, 
2005). Some Supreme Court justices have concurred. In 1996, for example, Justice Kennedy explained to 
the House Appropriations Committee: 
We had mandatory jurisdiction over cases that were unimportant. We calculated that there were 
35 to 40 of these a year. We told the Congress, please take those cases away from us, and the 
Congress did. And in part what you see after 1988 is a drop which we projected (Hellman 1996, 
409). 
Indeed, Owens and Simon (2012) provide evidence that the 1988 Act has had exactly this effect. 
Consequently, we expect that prior to 1988, the Court heard more cases, and after 1988, it heard fewer. 
 Including a dummy variable for the 1988 law is appropriate, especially given the attention that 
others have paid to the potential effects of this law, but it is a blunt institutional measure. A more nuanced 
approach is to consider broader changes in the Court over time. In particular, McGuire (2004) has argued 
that changes in the institutionalization of the Court have put justices in a better position to achieve their 
goals and that it has increased the Court’s control over its agenda. As the Court becomes more 
institutionalized, it has a greater capacity to address issues it deems important. Thus, we expect that the 
Court will hear more cases as institutionalization increases.  
A third institution that might influence the size of the Court’s docket is the join-3 practice. 
Although since 1925 the process has required at least four votes to grant review for writs of certiorari – 
the so-called Rule of Four – starting in the 1970s some justices announced that they would cast a vote to 
grant cert if three other justices did the same. When a justice embraces this approach, it effectively 
reduces the number of votes needed to grant cert from four to three, since that justice has indicated that 
whenever there are three justices who favor hearing a case, he or she will provide the necessary fourth 
vote.13 Since the casting of a join-3 vote can reduce the number of justices needed to grant cert, some 
                                                 
13
 There may be instances in which the justice who favors the join-3 practice is already one of three justices who 
have indicated that they would like to grant cert, in which case the justice’s adherence to join-3 is irrelevant. But as 
long as there are other cases where this justice is not one of three justices who favor granting cert, adherence to this 
practice will increase the docket size. 
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have proposed that the join-3 practice is linked to fluctuations in the Court’s docket (O’Brien 1997a; 
2005), with the Court likely to hear more cases when one or more of its members favor this practice, and 
fewer otherwise. 
Many scholars also contend that the Court considers the preferences of other external actors. One 
such actor is the public. As Clark (2009, 2011) argues, public opinion is filtered through Congress, with 
negative opinion toward the Court leading legislators to introduce more court-curbing bills. Since these 
bills, if they were to become law, could potentially undermine the Court’s legitimacy, justices will react 
to an increase in the introduction of court-curbing bills by becoming more cautious. Thus, the Court may 
hear fewer cases when it is faced with a larger number of court-curbing bills, and is free to hear more 
when it feels less threatened.14 Second, the Solicitor General (SG) may play a crucial role in determining 
docket size, with the Court much more likely to take cases when the SG is a petitioner (Cordray and 
Cordray 2001).  
Data 
To measure our dependent variable, the size of the Court’s docket, we use the number of cases 
that receive plenary consideration per term. A case is considered part of the plenary docket if it was an 
orally argued, non-decree, non-memorandum case disposed of by either signed or per curiam opinion.15 
                                                 
14
 Clark (2011) demonstrates that the Court overturns fewer bills and adjusts its opinions when the public opposes 
the Court (as captured by the number of court-curbing laws introduced). He does not examine docket size; but given 
that his emphasis is on whether the Court behaves more cautiously, it is a reasonable extension to examine whether 
the Court hears fewer cases when it feels besieged. Of course, since the Court is also reacting to the actions of 
Congress, this could also be seen as another version of a separation of powers argument. However, Clark makes it 
clear that he uses court-curbing bills as a way to capture public unhappiness with the Court.  
15
 Although Hellman (1996) argues that all orally argued cases, including those disposed of by per curiam opinions, 
fall under the plenary docket heading, he notes that other analyses count only signed opinions. We employ 
Hellman’s (1996) definition, which comprises DEC_TYPEs 1, 5, 6, and 7 from The Original United States Supreme 
Court Judicial Database. Additional information was also obtained from the Chief Justice’s Annual Report. If we 
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Due to the availability of our independent variables, our analysis focuses on the 1946-2005 period.  
Measuring the Strategic Variables 
We coded several variables to assess our hypotheses about strategic behavior. To begin with, as 
the Uncertainty Hypothesis details, one might expect that a justice's willingness to support granting cert 
depends upon his or her certainty about the likely outcome of the case, should the Court decide to hear it. 
This certainty is contingent on two factors. First, it depends upon the stability of a winning coalition. If 
there are five like-minded justices who vote together consistently, members of the coalition are likely to 
assume that they will be part of the winning coalition. Conversely, if there is no dominant majority 
coalition, justices will decide on cert in the face of greater uncertainty about the eventual outcome (and 
the coalition supporting that outcome). In the former case, more justices are likely to vote for cert, leading 
to a larger docket.  
To investigate the effects of the stability of winning coalitions, we identified the five justices who 
voted as a bloc most frequently during the previous term. We then calculated the percentage of each 
term's opinions that included these five justices. When this percentage is high, the winning coalition is 
stable and justices in that coalition are more certain about the Court's likely decision and also more 
convinced that they will be in the majority, making them more likely to vote to grant cert. Consequently, 
we expect that this variable, Stable Winning Coalition, will have a positive coefficient. 
Second, a justice’s level of confidence in the outcome depends on divisions within the Court. If 
the Court is evenly divided, then winning coalitions will be smaller. Such coalitions will yield more 
uncertainty about the outcome, since the switch of one or two justices can change the outcome. On the 
other hand, when winning coalitions are large and the Court is not evenly divided, the outcome is more 
certain, leading more justices to vote to grant cert. To capture this concept, we created a variable called 
Split Decisions, which is the percentage of cases in the previous term that were decided by a close or 
                                                                                                                                                             
instead use Owens and Simon’s (2012) measure of the docket in place of our own, many of the results are similar to 
those we report here, although Stable Winning Coalition no longer achieves significance. 
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“split” decision. We calculated this variable by dividing the number of 5-4 decisions by the number of 
cases on the Court’s docket. We expect this variable to have a negative coefficient. 
One potential problem with Split Decisions is that although a large number of 5-4 decisions might 
indicate uncertainty, the majority might not always consist of the same five justices. For example, there 
might be many 5-4 decisions, but if the same five justices always vote together, there is little or no 
uncertainty.16 Nonetheless, it is reasonably likely that the composition of votes on cases in a term might 
affect docket size in future terms. If all of the votes on a term’s cases are ideologically connected, then 
there is no uncertainty surrounding the outcomes of cases.17 If, on the other hand, all of the votes on cases 
in a particular term are ideologically disconnected, then one would be more uncertain about the outcomes 
of cases. Thus, we expect that an increase in the percentage of votes on cases that are ideologically 
disconnected should result in fewer cases on the docket. 
To measure this concept, we created a variable, Ideologically Disconnected Coalitions, which is 
the percentage of cases in the previous term that were decided by ideologically disconnected coalitions 
(Edelman, Klein, and Lindquist 2008). We used a three-step process to compute values for this variable. 
First, we used Judicial Common Space scores to measure the ideology of justices in each term. Second, 
we counted the number of cases in each term that were decided by ideologically disconnected coalitions. 
Finally, we divided the number of these cases by the total size of the docket. 
                                                 
16To assess whether this occurred, we examined the correlation between the percentage of 5-4 cases and the 
percentage of those cases in which the most common coalition of five justices voted together. We found little 
correlation (r=.104), indicating that as the number of 5-4 cases increases, it is not that the same five justices are 
winning more frequently. Therefore, the percentage of 5-4 cases provides a reasonable, if rough, measure of 
uncertainty about case outcomes. 
17
 A vote on a case is ideologically connected if at least five justices in the same ideological alignment vote in the 
majority on that case (see Edelman, Klein, and Lindquist 2008). For instance, if the five most liberal justices 
comprise the majority vote on a case, then that case is considered to be ideologically connected. 
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To examine whether justices are sensitive to the Court’s external political environment and 
whether they behave strategically with respect to this environment when deciding whether to hear cases, 
we created a variable called Supreme Court Outlier. Based on ideology scores computed by Bailey 
(2013), this dummy variable is set equal to one when the median Supreme Court justice’s ideology is 
located outside of the range of preferences of the president and the median Senate and House members 
during the previous term, and zero otherwise. 18 We employ this measure because Congress needs the 
president’s assent (and vice versa) to overturn the Court. We use this variable to test H2, the Separation of 
Powers Hypothesis, and expect a negative coefficient. 
Measuring Additional Influences 
In addition to our strategic variables, we also need to measure the control variables we identified 
earlier. To investigate whether the Court hears more cases when Congress has passed a higher number of 
laws, we use those laws that were deemed major when they were passed and that would have attracted the 
attention of other political actors at that time (Mayhew 2005). Although the Court can hear cases that 
challenge laws from any era, it frequently hears challenges to relatively recent laws (e.g., Dahl 1957). 
Hence, Major Laws consists of the sum of Mayhew’s (2005) Sweep One laws passed within the previous 
four years.19 
We created two variables to assess whether ideological harmony between the Supreme Court and 
the lower courts shapes docket size. The first measure, Judicial Agreement, is a binary variable that is 
coded one when the lower courts and the Court have similar preferences during the current term – more 
specifically, when the majority of the appellate courts are composed of Democrats (Republicans) and a 
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 These scores draw upon observations in which there exist “bridges” between members of Congress, the president, 
and the Court. These bridges include amicus briefs, comments by members of Congress, roll call votes by members 
of Congress, votes on Supreme Court cases by Justices, and cosponsorship (Bailey 2013). 
19
 The results are nearly identical if we extend the time period to five or six years. The only difference is that the 
significance of Stable Winning Coalition drops slightly below the level of p<.05. 
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majority of Supreme Court justices are liberal (conservative).20 This measure should have a negative 
coefficient, indicating that the Court will hear more cases when it is generally disagrees with the lower 
courts.  
The second measure, Supreme-Appellate Court Distance, is calculated as the absolute value of 
the distance between the Supreme Court median and the median appellate court during the current term, 
using Judicial Common Space scores (Epstein et al. 2007). This variable should have a positive effect, 
indicating that the more ideologically distant the appellate courts are from the Supreme Court, the more 
cases the Court will choose to hear. 
 To control for the potential effect of the 1988 Act on the Court’s docket, we created a Post-1988 
dummy, which we coded as one for years after 1988. If this Act produced a reduction in the number of 
cases, then we should observe a negative coefficient. To measure changes in the Court’s capacity over 
time, we used McGuire’s (2004) measure of institutionalization. We expect the coefficient on this 
variable, Institutionalization, to be positive. To ascertain whether changes in the tendency of justices to 
join-3 can account for the temporal changes in docket, we draw upon O’Brien’s (1997b) argument that 
Blackmun was the most frequent, well-known supporter of this approach, and we created a dummy to 
denote the years in which Blackmun served on the Court. Although this measure is blunt, it captures the 
view that Blackmun was the justice who was most committed to casting join-3 votes. We expect this 
variable, Blackmun/Join-3, to have a positive sign. 
We use two measures to measure the additional effects of other external influences. To capture 
the Court’s concerns about its legitimacy, we used data from Clark (2009, 2011) on the number of court-
curbing proposals that the House and Senate proposed in the previous Congress. We used the previous 
term since it takes time for the Court to respond to such signals. Then, we logarithmically transformed 
this variable, since Clark (2009, 2011) posits that the relationship between Court reaction and the number 
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 We use Martin-Quinn scores to measure liberal and conservative, where median scores less than zero are liberal 
and those greater than zero are conservative. 
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of court-curbing proposals that Congress proposes is non-monotonic.21 Finally, to ascertain whether 
variation in docket size is a function of the Solicitor General’s interest in appearing before the Court, we 
created a variable, Solicitor General Petitions, that is the number of petitions filed by the SG during the 
current term. We expect a positive coefficient for this variable.22 
Analysis and Results 
Because our dependent variable is the change in the number of cases that the Court hears in each 
year, it is possible that the observations in our dataset are not independent of each other. The use of 
standard least squares techniques in such cases can produce spurious results, where relationships appear 
to be significant but actually are not (i.e., Type I error). Thus, we need to check for stationarity and 
autocorrelation to verify which estimation technique is appropriate for the data that we seek to analyze. 
To check for stationarity, we begin with Figure One, which displays the number of cases that the 
Court hears each year. Although the data do not show evidence of a long-term, monotonic trend, it is also 
clear that the mean of the variable is not constant over time. This visual impression is supported by an 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, which fails to reject the null of a unit root (p=.70).23 Similarly a 
KPSS test, which treats stationarity as the null hypothesis, rejects the null in the first ten of fifteen lag 
orders. Thus, we cannot conclusively rule out the possibility of a unit root, since the results of our test are 
sensitive to the lag-order specification. 
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 More specifically, he argues that there exists a tipping point after which the Court responds to court-curbing bills. 
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where Bills is the number of court-curbing bills introduced in either chamber during the previous two Congresses. 
22
 We obtained this variable from the Annual Report of the Attorney General in each year. 
23
 We also ran the Phillips-Perron test, which similarly did not allow us to reject the null for a unit root. In addition, 
a Durbin-Watson test indicates that our data show some evidence of autocorrelation. Although simply running a 
Koyck model would address the autocorrelation problem, such an approach is inappropriate when data are non-
stationary (Keele and Kelly 2006). 
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Given that the ADF test suggests the potential presence of a unit root and the KPSS test does not 
eliminate this possibility, the conservative approach is to use an error-correction model (ECM). Following 
De Boef and Keele (2008), we utilize the approach that is the most appropriate for non-stationary data and 
is also least restrictive in the constraints it implicitly places on that data. Thus, this model provides an 
appropriate econometric tool we can use to assess our hypotheses. It also allows us to learn whether our 
independent variables have a transitory (i.e., short-term) effect, an equilibrium-like long run (i.e., long-
term) effect, or both.24 Finally, we include a lagged version of our dependent variable on the right-hand 
side of our equation, which is standard in ECMs.25  
[TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE] 
Assessing the Uncertainty Hypothesis 
Table One displays our results. Overall, the fit of the model is very good, as is common with 
ECMs. In addition, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable falls between 0 and -1, indicating that 
the use of an ECM is appropriate. More importantly, our findings provide some support for our 
                                                 
24
 Short-term effects occur if a change in the value of an independent variable yields an immediate change in the size 
of the Court’s docket. Conversely, long-term effects provide indication of a long-term equilibrium relationship 
between the independent variable and the dependent variable. If we find only short-term effects, this suggests that an 
ECM might not be appropriate. 
25
 The lagged dependent variable provides two pieces of information. First, it shows how the previous level of the 
number of cases affects the change from that level. Second, and more importantly, it provides essential information 
about the rates at which the effects of other independent variables decay. These two points are essentially two sides 
of the same coin. Because the process is dynamic, the outcome adjusts slowly (i.e., the past is sticky), which has the 
implication that the effects of the independent variables decay (at a rate indicated by the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable). More generally, the outcome, being observed over time, is a temporally dynamic process, 
which involves partial adjustment over time (as indicated by the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable) and 
not immediate, complete adjustment to equilibria given by the set of explanatory-variable levels. 
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hypotheses and show that the cert process, with the discretion it gives justices, provides the opportunity 
for strategic behavior with respect to the size of the docket. 
Starting with the Uncertainty Hypothesis, we find that Stable Winning Coalition has a positive 
and significant effect on docket size, indicating that over the short run, an increase in the coalition’s 
certainty that it will win leads to an increase in the number of cases it places on the docket. This finding 
also lends support to the argument, made by many authors (e.g., Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn 1999), that 
justices are likely to be wary of hearing cases when they are uncertain of the outcome. Our results show 
that a ten percent increase in the proportion of cases won by this coalition corresponds to an immediate 
increase in the Court’s caseload of 4.2 cases.26 
Although the results for Stable Winning Coalition furnish evidence that internal considerations 
and uncertainty affect docket size in predictable and systematic ways, we find no support for our other 
measures of internal strategic behavior. Neither Split Decisions nor Ideologically Disconnected Coalitions 
had the expected effect; nor did several other variables that could be seen as capturing the effect of 
internal uncertainty.27 While there is some support for the Uncertainty Hypothesis due to the effect of 
Stable Winning Coalition, overall evidence for this hypothesis is best described as mixed. 
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 The lack of significance for the long-run variable shows that there is no relationship between the level of the 
stability of the winning coalition and docket size. That is, the short-term variable captures the transitory relationship, 
but the result for the long-term variable indicates that there is no further disequilibrium to be corrected over time. 
Overall, then, although the level of Stable Winning Coalition does not affect the overall docket size, a change in the 
stability of the winning coalition does.  
27
 We examined some other reasonable indicators of uncertainty, like the length of time that a natural Court has been 
in existence (under the idea that this produces less uncertainty over time), the standard deviation of the ideologies of 
the justices, and the distance between the most liberal and the most conservative justices in each Court. None of 
these produced the expected effect. It is possible that split decisions might matter in some policy areas, but not 
others; or that some types of split decisions foster uncertainty while others do not. Investigation of these sorts of 
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Assessing the Separation of Powers Hypothesis 
Moving to the external considerations outlined in our second hypothesis, we find substantial 
evidence that the Court considers the preferences of other institutions when deciding on its caseload. 
More specifically, we argued that the cert process allows discretion and the opportunity for strategic 
behavior – not by having justices and clerks examine each specific case to determine whether Congress 
might object, but by leading to greater caution when the other branches are more distant. The results for 
Supreme Court Outlier demonstrate the expected negative and statistically significant effects predicted by 
the Separation of Powers Hypothesis, both in the short term and the long term.  
Recall that this variable is set equal to one when the Court’s preferences (as measured by the 
median member of the Court) fall outside of the Pareto set for the House, Senate, and president. Our 
results indicate that when the Court is an ideological outlier vis-à-vis these other institutions, it hears 
fewer cases.28 The significance of the short-term variable indicates that the transition from the Court not 
being an outlier to being an outlier creates momentum for the Court to take fewer cases – roughly eleven 
                                                                                                                                                             
questions holds promise, but entails an individual-level analysis of decisions that puts it beyond the reach of this 
paper. 
28
 A counter-argument might hold that a more distant Congress or president may generate a higher number of laws 
that the Court finds objectionable. If true, then a situation in which the Court is ideologically distant from one of 
these branches might produce a higher number of cases that the Court considers. We tested this by including three 
variables – the absolute values of the distances from the median justice to the president, the median member of the 
House, and the median member of the Senate – in our model, both with and without Supreme Court Outlier. In 
doing so, we find some, albeit limited, support for this counter-argument, with the distance between the Court and 
Senate medians significantly associated with only a long-term decrease in docket size (p<.05 without Supreme Court 
Outlier included; p<.10 with it included), and the distance between the Court and president significantly connected 
with only a short-term decrease in docket size (p<.05 without Supreme Court Outlier included; p<.10 with it 
included). We observe no such effect for the House. In addition, the Supreme Court Outlier measure remains 
significant and negative.  
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fewer cases, according to our results. In addition, the significance of the long-term variable shows that 
there is an effect between the level of our independent variable (i.e., whether the Court is an outlier) and 
the overall size of the docket.29 Hence, even if the Court sometimes shifts to other types of cases, it is 
more selective overall when its views are at odds with the preferences of the elected branches.30  
Our study thus joins previous studies that have found evidence of the Court acting in a strategic 
manner relative to other political institutions on an individual or aggregate level (e.g., Bailey and 
Maltzman 2011; Clark 2011; Epstein and Knight 1998; Harvey and Friedman 2006, 2009; McGuire 
2004). Other studies, however, have produced mixed results, or have found no evidence at all (e.g., 
Owens 2010; Sala and Spriggs 2004; Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist 2011). While scholars need to 
continue exploring the effect of external institutions on the Court’s actions, our results speak to this 
debate by providing evidence that the Court considers the preferences of other institutions when it decides 
the size of its docket in aggregate, and more generally by showing that separation-of-powers concerns 
influence the Court’s aggregate level actions (e.g., Epstein and Knight 1998; Epstein, Segal and Victor 
2002).  
Control Variables 
Although our primary interest is in the effect of the strategic variables discussed above, our tests 
reveal some interesting results for our control variables. We find limited support for three of our controls 
                                                 
29
 We also tested our argument using a dynamic, but non-ECM, approach. Results are essentially the same as those 
presented here. However, because Supreme Court Outlier shows evidence of a long-run equilibrium relationship 
with the size of the docket, we present the ECM results.  
30
 The coefficient on our lagged dependent variable allows us to more precisely estimate the nature of the short- and 
long-term influences of Supreme Court Outlier. When this variable equals one, it produces an immediate decrease of 
10.9 cases. However, the long-run effect indicates that it also disrupts the long-term equilibrium between the two 
variables. The long-run response is that the presence of an outlier decreases the number of cases by a total of 12.6, 
with this total spread out over future time periods with a decay of 54% (based on the coefficient on the lagged 
number of cases) per period.  
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as short-term effects, with findings that are best viewed as suggestive, since each of these three controls 
falls just short of the standard level of p<.05 (i.e., all three meet the more relaxed standard of p<.10). 
First, the number of petitions filed by the Solicitor General is associated with an increase in docket size, 
with three additional petitions in a term increasing the size of the docket by approximately one case in the 
short-term. Second, we find that the 1988 law led to a decrease in docket size, producing a transitory 
decrease of approximately 21 cases per term.31 Finally, the results for our Blackmun/Join-3 variable 
indicate that Blackmun’s support for the Join-3 approach yielded an increase of 12 cases per term.32  
At the same time, we find no support for our other control variables. Unlike Owens and Simon 
(2012), we find no effect for the difference between the Supreme Court and appellate courts, with neither 
Judicial Agreement nor Supreme-Appellate Court Distance producing the predicted effects. Additionally, 
the Court’s capacity, as measured by Institutionalization, has no effect on docket size. Moreover, the 
Court also does not appear to respond to the number of court-curbing bills that were introduced in 
Congress, nor does it appear to respond to the number of major laws on the federal level. 
Additional Checks 
We also examined many other variables that have been suggested as potential influences, even 
though they are not identified or investigated as frequently as the controls included in Table One.33 
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 As we noted earlier, the dummy variable for the 1988 law is a blunt measure and is not theoretically motivated. 
But because so many other scholars have made claims for the effect of this law, we have included it in our model. 
We also examined whether the 1988 law created a situation in which short-run effects began to play a larger role, 
and did so by interacting the post-1988 dummy with our theoretical variables and by examining results before and 
after the passage of this law. Doing this produced no support for the idea that short-term factors were enhanced after 
1988. 
32
 Since there is some evidence that Justice White also favored a join-3 approach, we ran a model that included a 
dummy variable for White. This variable was not significant, and did not affect our main theoretical results. 
33
 We encourage caution in interpreting the findings for the various control variables discussed throughout this 
section. More specifically, some of these variables depend on individual-level arguments, yet we have aggregate-
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Among others, we found that the following control variables had no effect on docket size: the number of 
cases following from original jurisdiction (Sternberg 2008); the number of in forma pauperis petitions; 
appellate experience (Coyle 2007); the number of liberal justices on the Court (Hellman 1996); the 
number of new issues that the Court considers when compared to the previous term (Pacelle 1991),34 and 
a measure of judicial activism.35 Another variable – the number of justices in the cert pool – was 
(surprisingly) significant in the opposite direction.36 In the overwhelming majority of instances, the 
inclusion of these other variables had little or no effect on our main variables of interest. 
                                                                                                                                                             
level data. This is not a problem for our theoretical variables (or the controls in Table One), since for one strategic 
claim, we have presented an argument about how the individual incentives aggregate, while for the other the 
argument itself is at the aggregate level. 
34
 We also used the number of new issues that the Court considers between t-2 and t-1, between t-3 and t-2, and 
finally, between t-4 and t-3 in separate models, and uncovered no statistically significant effects for this variable. 
We used these varying lags to investigate the possibility that it takes time for additional cases to percolate to the 
Court that are related to new issues that the Court heard in previous terms. 
35
 Judicial activism is a notoriously slippery concept (e.g., Lindquist and Cross 2009). Since there is no definitive 
measure, we adopt one employed by Yale law professor Paul Gerwitz and former Justice Stevens clerk Chad Golder 
(2005; see also Ringhand 2007): we take all cases in which the federal government is a party and calculate the 
percentage of these cases in which the Court decided against the government. This is consistent with one of the 
primary dimensions of judicial activism that Canon (1983) identifies, namely, that activism exists when the courts 
rule against policies that were created and are supported by majoritarian institutions. 
36
 As we noted earlier, we did not expect the creation of the cert pool to produce a reduction in docket size, since the 
greatest effect of the pool is to more efficiently eliminate cases that would never get on the docket anyway (Palmer 
2001; Perry 1991). Our results are consistent with arguments made by Cordray and Cordray (2001) and with Owens 
and Simon’s (2012) findings. A dummy for the presence of the cert pool, rather than the number of justices 
participating, similarly did not demonstrate a reduction in docket size. Notably, the effects for Supreme Court 
Outlier were stronger when we included this dummy variable than they are in the results reported here. 
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In addition, at least one participant – Justice Souter – has pointed toward the homogeneity of the 
lower courts as an explanation for the decrease in recent years (Stras 2010), although some law scholars 
remain skeptical of this claim. Cordray and Cordray (2001), for example, point out that even with 
increasing homogeneity, there are still hundreds of splits at the appellate level each year, leaving the 
justices with no shortage of controversies to tackle. Nonetheless, we created a new variable to assess 
Justice Souter’s claims.37 In doing so, we find that the homogeneity of the lower courts did not affect 
docket size in either the short or long-term. 
Finally, Stras (2010) used Justice Blackmun’s notes to demonstrate that justices were replaced by 
new justices during the late 1980s and early 1990s who consistently voted to hear fewer cases. Although 
we do not have this sort of individual-level data over the entire period, and while this factor does not 
account for why these new justices behaved in this manner, we can account for the number of new justices 
in each Court. When we do so, we find that this variable has no consistent effect on docket size, and its 
inclusion has little effect on our other results.38 
Conclusion 
 The content and size of Court’s docket says much about the place and role of the Court in the 
American political system (Owens and Simon 2012). At a minimum, when the docket is larger, the Court 
has the opportunity to play more of a policymaking role. And when it is smaller, it removes the Court 
from addressing important policy and political questions. 
 Some scholars have suggested that change in docket size is not “a result of a conscious and 
collective or strategic decision” (O’Brien 2005, 134). Our findings, though, provide evidence that justices 
act strategically when setting the docket. In particular, we find strong evidence that separation-of-powers 
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 We used the following equation to measure the homogeneity of the lower courts: Homogeneity= |50-Percentage of 
Appellate Judges from the Republican Party|. The presence of this variable does not affect the signs or significance 
patterns of our main variables of interest. Using instead the change in this variable from t-2 to t-1 produces no 
significant findings and has no effect on our primary variables.  
38
 The only change is that the long-term effect for Supreme Court Outlier drops to the p<.10 level of significance.  
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considerations matter, and weaker evidence that internal uncertainty has a significant effect. As justices 
become more certain about the likely choices of their colleagues, and more confident that their decisions 
will not trigger negative reactions from elected officials, they hear more cases; and as they become less 
certain about their colleagues and more worried about the reactions of the other branches, they hear fewer. 
Thus, we provide direct evidence that the size of the agenda in one year is more than just a function of the 
docket in prior years. Rather, the size of the Court’s docket is a function of the ideological location of the 
Court, relative to other branches, and (to a lesser degree) the preferences of those who sit on the Court. 
Beyond providing support for our hypotheses, the results also yield insights regarding potential 
causal variables identified by other scholars and observers, such as the number of petitions that the 
Solicitor General submitted. Further, our analysis focuses on docket size over time, and not just on the 
recent decrease (which is the focus of most legal scholarship on this question). In doing so, it provides 
more complete evidence regarding the effect of strategic considerations and other factors.  
Some questions, of course, remain unanswered. Since individual-level data on cert decisions is 
not available over the entire time frame we examine, we cannot assess how individual replacement of one 
justice by another influences docket size. It seems possible that this notion of replacement is a potential 
cause of changes in the docket size (e.g., Stras 2010), but this finding then leads to questions about why 
new justices have different preferences regarding the Court’s workload than the justices they are 
replacing. We also cannot assess how litigant behavior affects the likelihood that a particular case 
comprises the docket. Such behavior certainly influences whether a particular case becomes a part of the 
docket (e.g., Mak, Sidman, and Sommer 2013), and could affect the overall caseload.  
Second, we do not, and cannot, explore all possible explanations that have been offered to explain 
the diminishing docket. For example, we do not explore the effects of the median age of Supreme Court 
justices, the median length of tenure on the Court, specific facets of the ways in which different Chief 
Justices have led the Court, or the differences in the length of total opinions for cases in each term. That 
said, we have considered many of the most common explanations that scholars have offered to explain 
variance in docket size. Given the robustness of our results to these many alternative explanations, we 
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have no reason to believe that the results would not continue to hold, even after including other 
explanations. 
Finally, we do not explore the consequences of a diminishing docket (e.g., Lazarus 2009). Does 
docket size affect justices’ behavior and public perceptions of the Court? How might it influence the 
scope and magnitude of the Court’s power? In other words, do we need to see an increase in docket size 
to conclude that the Court “matters?” Our analysis provides a useful springboard for future studies to 
investigate these and other topics, as it shows that docket size varies over time, and that this variation has 
a systematic component; that strategic considerations, both internal and external, come into play in 
determining the size of the docket; and that some (although not all) of the other factors that various 
observers have posited as being influential do indeed have the predicted effects on docket size. 
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Short-term effects Long-term effects 
Uncertainty Hypothesis 
Stable Winning Coalition + .42* (.24) 
-.03 
(.34) 
Split Decisions - .88^ (.48) 
.48 
(.60) 
Ideologically Disconnected Coalitions - .29 (.23) 
.53^ 
(.31) 
Separation of Powers Hypotheses 




Major Laws + .08 (.51) 
.02 
(.35) 
Judicial Agreement - 13.08^ (4.68) 
-.69 
(4.38) 
Supreme-Appellate Court Distance + 13.33 (23.31) 
-10.44 
(20.27) 
Post-1988 - -20.92 (13.78) 
-9.27 
(14.77) 
Institutionalization + 27.88 (42.04) 
17.19 
(33.59) 
Blackmun/Join-3 + 12.06 (8.40) 
3.65 
(7.05) 
Court Curbing - 48.48 (87.18) 
61.40 
(62.15) 
Solicitor General Petitions + .33 (.24) 
.43 
(.40) 
Lagged Supreme Court Docket N/A -.54** (.20) 
Constant -35.60 (44.90) 
N 54 
Adjusted R-Squared .742 
Mean Squared Error 8.32 
F-Test 3.23 
Prob>F .0016 
Notes: Dependent variable is the change in docket size during each term. The values in parentheses are 
standard errors. * denotes p<.05 and ** denotes p<.01 using one-tailed tests. ^ denotes significant at 
.05 in the opposite direction than that predicted by the hypothesis. 
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Source Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Docket The Original United States Supreme Court Database 
 
116.12 26.52 74 157 
Stable Winning Coalition The Original United States Supreme Court Database 
 
57.60 9.24 32.97 73.49 
Split Decisions The Original United States Supreme Court Database 
 




The Original United States Supreme Court Database 67.55 14.04 37.33 96.77 
Supreme Court Outlier 
 
Bailey (2013) .31 .47 0 1 
Major Laws Mayhew (2005) 
 
19.78 5.27 11 33 
Judicial Agreement Supreme Court Ideology: Epstein, Martin, Segal and 
Westerland (2007) 
 
Partisan Composition of the Lower Courts: Gryski and Zuk 
(2004) 
.57 .50 0 1 
Supreme-Appellate 
Court Distance 
Epstein, Martin, Segal and Westerland (2007) .16 .10 .004 .38 
Post-1988 N/A 
 
.28 .45 0 1 
Institutionalization 
 
McGuire (2004) 1.19 .11 .92 1.37 
Blackmun/Join-3 N/A 
 
.42 .50 0 1 
Court Curbing Clark (2009, 2011) 
 






Annual Report of the Attorney General 29.27 11.53 9 61 
 
